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ARTICLES
DOMESTIC ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE AND
THE CONSTITUTION
LAWRENCE FRIEDMANt AND RENI E

M.

LANDERS~t

In late 2005, the New York Times reported that President George W.
Bush had ordered the National Security Agency ("NSA") in 2002 to undertake a comprehensive electronic surveillance program covering domestic and international telephone calls and Internet communication. 1
As of this writing, the details of the program remain unclear, but Times
reporter James Risen, relying on information provided by administration
sources, has characterized the effort by the NSA as possibly "the largest
domestic spying operation since the 1960s, larger than anything conducted by the FBI or CIA inside the United States since the Vietnam
War." 2 Pursuant to the President's executive order, Risen continues, the
NSA may be eavesdropping on as many as 500 people in the United
States at any moment and "it potentially has access to the phone calls
and e-mails of millions more."3 Another report suggests that tens of
t Assistant Professor of Law, New England School of Law.
tt Associate Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School.
1. See James Risen and Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without
Courts, N.Y. Times Al Dec. 16, 2005) (revealing existence of 2002 executive order purporting to authorize warrantless eavesdropping on persons inside the United States). Risen
and Lichtblau won the 2006 Pulitzer Prize for National Reporting for their stories on President Bush's domestic eavesdropping program. See The Pulitzer Prize Winners 2006, http://
www.pulitzer.org/2006/2006.html. (accessed Sept. 14, 2006).
2. James Risen, State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration, 45 (Free Press 2006).
3. Id. at 44. See also Court Filings Tell of Internet Spying, N.Y. Times A6 (Apr. 7,
2006) (discussing private telephone company efforts to cooperate with the NSA by installing equipment capable of "vacuum-cleaner surveillance" of e-mail and Internet communications). In May 2006, USA Today revealed that, in addition to the NSA's domestic electronic
surveillance program, the agency also has been covertly collecting the phone records of
many millions of Americans in an effort to analyze calling patterns that evidence terrorist
activity. Leslie Cauley, NSA Has Massive Databaseof Americans' Phone Calls, USA Today
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thousands of Americans have had their calls monitored under the aus4
pices of the NSA's program.
Shortly after the revelation of the President's domestic electronic
surveillance program, United States Representative Michael Capuano
(D-Massachusetts) asked professors of constitutional law teaching at
Massachusetts-area law schools to provide him with opinions regarding
the constitutionality of the President's program. We responded to Representative Capuano's request independently and here combine our responses to address more comprehensively the constitutional questions
raised by the President's domestic electronic surveillance program. We
conclude, first, that the President lacked the statutory or constitutional
power to authorize such a program and, second, that the program runs
afoul to the letter and the spirit of the constitutional protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures embraced by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
I.
The first issue is whether the President had the authority to order
the NSA to conduct surveillance of electronic communications, including
communications involving United States citizens, without a court order.
The President suggested, primarily through his Attorney General, Alberto Gonzales, that such authority may be found in the Joint Resolution
of Congress authorizing the use of military force in Iraq, 5 and in the powers accorded the Executive in Article II of the United States Constitution. As set forth below, we conclude that neither the AUMF nor any
other statutory law served to authorize the President's program of domestic electronic surveillance; further, his actions do not fall within the
Executive's enumerated constitutional powers. Indeed, the President's
assertion that he has the authority to act in these areas without the authorization of Congress or oversight by any court is contrary to both an
existing statutory scheme and the system of careful checks and delicate
balances among the branches enshrined in the U.S. Constitution by the
Framers.
A.
The modern understanding of the President's authority to guide foreign relations and provide for national security is based upon Justice
1A (May 11, 2006). The President denied the illegality of the surveillance work. See John
O'Neil, Bush Says U.S. Spying Is Not Widespread, N.Y. Times (May 11, 2006).
4. See Seymour M. Hersh, National Security Dept. Listening In, 82 The New Yorker
24, 25 (May 29, 2006).
5. Authorization for Use of Military Force ("AUMF"), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat.
224 (2001).

DOMESTIC ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

2006]

Robert Jackson's concurring opinion in a 1952 case, Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer.6 In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed
the question whether President Truman "was acting within his constitutional power when he issued an order directing the Secretary of Com7
merce to take possession of and operate most of the Nation's steel mills."
The government maintained that such action was necessary to avert any
lag in steel production during the Korean conflict. 8 The Court disagreed.
Justice Hugo Black, writing for the Court, stated that the President's
order did not fall within the authority accorded to the Executive by the
Constitution and, therefore, could not be upheld. 9
In his concurring opinion, Justice Jackson suggested that the constitutional scheme is more fluid than Justice Black's analysis acknowledged, and that the sphere of authority over matters related to foreign
affairs and national security might be divided into three areas.' 0 First,
when the President acts pursuant to Congressional authorization, he
possesses not just the powers accorded him by the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief, but also the powers Congress, in its wisdom, believes
he should exercise." Second, when the President acts without Congressional authorization, he relies only upon those powers conferred upon
him by the Constitution, though there may be matters upon which the
Congress and the President share overlapping authority, or upon which
the distribution of authority is less than clear.' 2 Finally, when the President takes measures incompatible with "the expressed or implied will of
Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon
his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Con3
gress over the matter."'
President Bush's electronic surveillance program falls into the third
category described by Justice Jackson for at least two reasons. First,
Congress and the President share overlapping constitutional authority
in matters of foreign affairs and national security. Second, Congress
neither expressly nor impliedly authorized the President to pursue the
electronic surveillance program in question; indeed, the program is contrary to an express Congressional mandate.
6. 343 U.S. 579, 634-38 (1952). See also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661
(1981) (suggesting that Justice Jackson's concurring opinion "brings together as much combination of analysis and common sense as there is in this area"); See id. at 669 (finding
"Justice Jackson's classification of executive actions into three general categories analyti-

cally useful.").
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 582.
See id.
See id. at 587-589.
See id. at 635-638 (Jackson, J., concurring).
See id. at 635-637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
See id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
Id. at 637-638 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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Regarding the first point, the Constitution expressly authorizes Congress, among other things, to "provide for the common Defence," 14 as
well as declare war, 15 and raise and support armies.1 6 The President, on
the other hand, has the authority to see "that the Laws [are] faithfully
executed,"' 7 and to serve as the Commander-in-Chief.1 8 Given these textual commitments of authority and responsibility, in no sense can it be
maintained that the Framers intended the President to have exclusive
authority over matters related to foreign affairs and national security. 19
Regarding the second point, the lack of Congressional authorization
for the President's electronic surveillance program is evidenced by the
existence of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA"), enacted
in 1978.20 Congress passed the FISA in the wake of the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. United States DistrictCourt,2 1 which
suggests that intelligence-gathering activities are not subject to the
same strict constitutional standards as criminal investigations. 2 2 As
amended by the USA PATRIOT Act, 2 3 the FISA establishes a regulatory
regime intended to protect the interests of citizens and non-citizens who
might be the object of the government's surveillance efforts. The Act contains provisions for a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 24 and standards for determining both ex ante and ex post authority to conduct
surveillance activities aimed at both citizens and non-citizens. 2 5 As of
14. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl.1.
15. See id. at cl.11.
16. See id. at cl.12.
17. Id. at art. II, § 3.
18. See id. at § 2, cl.1.
19. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 578 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (reasoning
that, "[i]f the situation demands it, the Executive can ask Congress to authorize suspension
of the writ [of habeas corpus]-which can be made subject to whatever conditions Congress
deems appropriate)"); see id. at 582 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that "Congress... has
a substantial and essential role in both foreign affairs and national security."). The Court
recently reiterated the shared nature of the power granted jointly to the President and
Congress in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2773 (2006) (holding that authority to
establish military commissions, if it exists, "can derive only from the powers granted jointly
to the President and Congress in time of war.").
20. 50 U.S.C. § 1801-1811.
21. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
22. See id. at 322-323 (recognizing that "domestic security surveillance may involve
different policy and practical considerations from the surveillance of 'ordinary crime'" and
inviting Congressional involvement in the creation of appropriate standards).
23. Pub. L. 107-56, § 218. 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
24. See 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)-(d).
25. See id.§ 1804(a). Indeed, the FISA permits applications for warrants up to 72
hours after surveillance has commenced in emergency situations. Insisting on the judicial
oversight mandated by Congress poses no threat to national security. See Hamdan, 126
S.Ct. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that "where, as here, [the government's stated
desire to try detainees by military commission] no emergency prevents consultation with
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2003, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court had received
thousands of requests for the FISA electronic surveillance orders and de26
nied only four.
Based upon what we know of the President's program, it does not
comply with the limitations established by the FISA. This type of surveillance activity does not present a case in which Congress contemplated the broad exercise of Presidential discretion. 27 Most importantly,
the program runs counter to the principle established by Congress that
such intelligence gathering must be subject to oversight in order to ensure some level of accountability. The President's program is contained
entirely within the Executive branch, and lacks any judicial or Congressional supervision: the NSA selects targets for monitoring, controls the
surveillance process, and makes all subsidiary determinations with respect to the privacy of the individuals under surveillance. 28 The only
oversight is provided by the Department of Justice; there is simply no
29
extra-institutional review.
Given the existence of the FISA, a federal statute that bears directly
on the activities in question and reflects express instruction from Congress as to the limits of the government's intelligence-gathering abilities,
the President must rely either upon some other indication of Congressional approval of the current electronic surveillance program, or upon
the powers inherent in the Executive Branch for the authority to pursue
the program. Such Congressional authority does not appear to exist.
The United States Department of Justice issued a letter dated December
19, 2005,30 and a memorandum dated January 19, 2006, in an effort to
justify the NSA's domestic electronic surveillance program. 3 1 The DeCongress, judicial insistence upon that consultation does not weaken our Nation's ability to
deal with danger.").
26. See Daniel J. Solove, Marc Rotenberg, & Paul M. Schwartz, Information Privacy
Law 289 (2d ed., Aspen 2006).
27. Cf Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678 (concluding, given the "general tenor" of the
Hostage Act and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, Congress had invited
the exercise of Presidential discretion in respect to international claims settlement
agreements).
28. See Risen, supra n. 2, at 44-45.
29. See e.g. Hamdan, 126 S.Ct. at 2800 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part) (noting that
the "Constitution's three-part system" was designed to avoid "[cloncentration of power.").
30. See Ltr. from William E. Moschella, Asst. Atty. General, to Hon. Pat Roberts, Hon.
Peter Hoekstra, Hon. John D. Rockefeller, IV, and Hon. Jane Harman, leaders of the Senate and House Intelligence committees, Moschella Letter (Dec. 22, 2005) (on file with the
Electronic Privacy Information Center) [hereinafter Moschella Letter].
31. See Memo. from the U.S Department of Justice, Legal Authorities Supporting the
Activities of the NationalSecurity Agency Described by the President(Jan. 19, 2006) (on file
with the Electronic Privacy Information Center). As noted above, see supra n. 1-4 and accompanying text, at this writing, it still remains difficult for the public and Congress to
evaluate the assertions and arguments made in these documents because the government
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partment takes the position that, in adopting the Authorization to Use
Military Force ("AUMF"), Congress implicitly authorized the govern32
ment to engage in warrantless domestic wiretapping during wartime.
It is difficult to believe that Congress, in adopting the AUMF, implicitly intended to nullify a process designed specifically in the FISA to
address the very types of activities involved in the President's program.
Any reasonable approach to statutory construction would require the
government to adhere to the more specific and detailed statute, in this
instance the FISA, unless Congress expressly and directly repealed it or
superseded it-which Congress has not done to date. 33 As the non-partisan Congressional Research Service concluded in a Memorandum dated
January 5, 2006, the Joint Resolution of Congress authorizing the use of
"all necessary and appropriate force" to engage those persons responsible
for the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, does not, in fact, provide
clear Congressional authority to pursue the current surveillance
34
program.
has not revealed essential details of the surveillance program that would permit an analysis of the assertions and arguments in relation to actual practices. Therefore, the DOJ's
efforts to justify practices that are not described or explained necessarily ring hollow.
32. See e.g. Moschella Letter, at 3 (arguing that "[clommunications intelligence... is a
fundamental incident of the use of military force.").
33. "It is a basic principle of statutory construction that a statute dealing with a narrow, precise, and specific subject is not submerged by a later enacted statute covering a
more generalized spectrum." Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153 (1976).
See also Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550-551 (1974) (noting that, "[wihere there is no
clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general
one, regardless of the priority of enactment.").
34. See Memo. from Elizabeth B. Bazan and Jennifer K. Elsea, Legis. Atty., Cong. Research Serv., PresidentialAuthority to Conduct Warrantless Electronic Surveillance to
GatherForeign Intelligence Information,43 (Jan. 5, 2006) (on file with Electronic Frontier
Foundation) (concluding that "Congress seems clearly to have contemplated that FISA
would continue to operate during war."). Further support for the conclusion of the Congressional Research Service may be found in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, in which the Supreme
Court ruled that authority, if it exists, for establishing and using military commissions
"can derive only from the powers granted jointly to the President and Congress in time of
war." 126 S.Ct. at 2773. The Court concluded that "there is nothing in the text or legislative history of the AUMF even hinting that Congress intended to expand or alter the authorization" contained in the Uniform Code of Military Justice regarding the military
tribunals. Id. at 2755. The Court earlier had noted that "[wihether or not the President has
independent power, absent Congressional authorization ... he may not disregard limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise of its own war powers, placed on his powers. Id.
at 2774. As one commentator put it, "In ruling that Congressional 'authorization for use of
military force,' passed in the days immediately after the September 11 attacks, cannot be
interpreted to legitimize the military commissions, the ruling poses a direct challenge to
the administration's legal justifications for its secret wire tapping program." Linda Greenhouse, Justices, 5-3, Broadly Reject Bush Plan to Try Detainees, N.Y. Times Al (June 30,
2006).
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B.
Similarly incorrect is the President's assertion that his position as
Commander in Chief under Article II gives him exclusive authority over
responses to enemy threats. Again, we do not challenge the proposition
that the President has wide authority to act when an imminent threat to
national security presents itself. However, as Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor noted in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 35 the Supreme Court has never
held that the President is free to ignore the Constitution or the will of
Congress in the exercise of war or foreign affairs powers: "[T]he position
that the courts must forgo any examination of the individual case and
focus exclusively on the legality of the broader . . .scheme cannot be

mandated by any reasonable view of separation of powers, as this approach serves only to condense power into a single branch of government."3 6 Indeed, the Court has "made clear that a state of war is not a

blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation's
37
citizens."
Although the President undeniably has broad constitutional author38
ity to take actions to defend the United States from foreign attack,
such authority is not unbounded. When, as is frequently the case, the
text of the document does not speak directly to the matter at hand, it is
helpful to look to the structure of the Constitution for guidance. 39 And
the structure of our constitutional democracy, with its design for separating and dividing powers through a system of interlocking checks and
balances among the branches of government, to the end of safeguarding
liberty and preventing tyranny, does not appear to contemplate that any
one branch of government will have the power to act unchecked in an
area that concerns so directly individual liberties. 40 As Justice O'Connor
35. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
36. Id. at 535-536 (opinion of O'Connor, J.) (emphasis in original).
37. Id. at 536 (opinion of O'Connor, J.). By determining in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld that
Congress had not authorized the President to create military commissions for the trial of
Guantanamo detainees, the Court reiterated this point. See 126 S.Ct. 2749, 2775 (2006); at
2799 (Breyer, J., concurring); at 2799 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).
38. See Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635, 668 (1863) (upon invasion of the United States, "the
President is not only authorized but bound to resist ... without waiting for any special
legislative authority.").
39. See e.g. Charles L. Black, Jr., Structureand Relationship in ConstitutionalLaw 11
(La. St. U. Press 1969) (advocating constitutional interpretation based upon the governmental structures and relationships that the Constitution establishes).
40. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2800 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part) (noting that the
"Constitution's three-part system" was designed to avoid "[cloncentration of power."). Justice Thomas reached an opposing conclusion in examining the structure of the Constitution. Id. at 2823 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The court's evident belief that it is qualified to
pass on the '[m]ilitary necessity,' of the Commander in Chiefs decision to employ a particular form of force against our enemies is so antithetical to our constitutional structure that it
simply cannot go unanswered.").
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put it in Hamdi, the Constitution "most assuredly envisions a role for all
three branches when individual liberties are at stake."4 1 It follows that
the President's domestic electronic surveillance program represents an
assertion of exclusive power beyond the province of the Executive.
To be sure, it is unlikely that the Framers could have foreseen our
current circumstances. But they did not have to: the system of checks
and balances they constructed is amenable to adaptation to today's
needs, and the U.S. Supreme Court has so concluded in numerous contexts and cases. 4 2 The important question, then, is what form that modern adaptation may take and still remain faithful to the system of
government that the Framers envisioned.
History has shown that the courts will defer to the executive department in respect to foreign affairs, due most likely to uncertainties about
the competence of the judiciary to review critically such decision-making. 43 This relative institutional competence does not excuse judicial reticence in matters related to the national defense, 44 and the Court has on
occasion asserted itself to limit the expansion of unchecked Executive
authority; in Hamdi, for example, the Court held, contrary to the administration's wishes, that a "citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual basis
for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's
factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker."45 But it remains
that the Court has regarded the political branches as uniquely situated
to participate in the formation of policy related to foreign affairs, and the
decision in Hamdi may represent only an effort to sketch outer constitutional limits while encouraging Congress to involve itself more thor41. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536 (opinion of O'Connor, J.).
42. Consider the Commerce Clause, which the Court has construed in conjunction with
the recognition of modern technological developments to allow Congress far greater authority to regulate individuals than the Framers might have imagined. See e.g. Gonzales v.
Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005) (upholding the Congressional regulation of possession of marijuana for medical use); Wickard v. Fillburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942) (upholding the
Congressional regulation of the production and consumption of homegrown wheat).
43. See Hamdan, 126 S.Ct. at 2823 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (where Executive competence is maximal and the Court's is virtually nonexistent, the Court should "respect the
Executive's judgment in matters of military operations and foreign affairs"); see also Louis
Henkin, Constitutionalism,Democracy, and ForeignAffairs 70-71 (Colum. U. Press 1990)
(discussing judicial deference to Congress and the Executive in foreign affairs matters)
(hereinafter Henkin); Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises
Always Be Constitutional?,112 Yale L.J. 1011, 1077 (2003) (discussing judicial deference in
foreign affairs matters).
44. See Henkin, supra n. 43, at 70-71 (criticizing judicial reluctance to critically review
cases involving foreign affairs).
45. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533.
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oughly in matters of national security. 46
As explained above, moreover, there is little doubt that Congress has
the constitutional power to participate in foreign policy and national security decision-making: the constitutional text is explicit on this point, 4 7
and history supports this understanding of Congressional authority. 48 It
follows that a scheme of government conduct that immediately and personally affects potentially all United States citizens, like the President's
domestic electronic surveillance program, ought to have been expressly
approved by the Congress before it is deemed constitutionally valid. The
Framers believed that the deliberative process that the citizenry's representatives must engage to authorize Executive action would ensure that
proper attention be paid the personal interests of Americans. The resulting balance between security and privacy ultimately might be the same
in this instance. But reaching that result through discussion, debate,
and compromise is a far cry from reaching it by executive fiat. Congressional involvement, in short, is another way-a means apart from judicial review and no less significant-that the Framers' commitment to
separation of powers may be appropriately respected. 4 9
II.
Regardless of one's view of whether legal authorization exists for the
President's actions, members of Congress should evaluate the President's domestic electronic surveillance program. In doing so, they should
assess the President's actions from the perspective of whether the kind of
nation the citizenry desires to have and to protect is possible given the
impact of unfettered surveillance on the lives of United States citizens
and their expectations of privacy. We maintain that the Fourth Amendment, and the values that it reflects, is relevant to any discussion of the
propriety of a program of domestic electronic surveillance.
46. The Court has been more explicit in recommending Congressional action in respect
to similar matters. See e.g. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring) (inviting
Congress to address the issue of military tribunal authorization); U.S. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 407
U.S. 297, 323-324 (1972) (inviting Congressional involvement in development of domestic
surveillance standards).
47. See supra n. 14-16 and accompanying text (discussing textual allocations of authority in respect to foreign and military affairs).
48. See e.g. H. Jefferson Powell, The President'sAuthority Over ForeignAffairs 109-113
(Carolina Academic Press 2002) (discussing Congressional authority to control federal
funding of governmental operations, as well as international trade and the war power);
Michael J. Glennon, The Gulf War and the Constitution, 70 For. Affairs, at 84, 96-99 (1991)
(discussing historical understanding of the Congressional war power).
49. See Hamdan, 126 S.Ct. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("The insistence [on consultation with Congress] strengthens the Nation's ability to determine-through democratic
means-how best to [meet the dangers the surveillance program purports to address].").
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A.
The Framers sought to protect an individual's privacy from government intrusion through the Fourth Amendment's probable cause and
warrant requirements. 50 These procedural prerequisites to governmental searches reflect the Framers' response to the "highhanded search
measures which Americans, as well as the people of England, had recently experienced." 5 1 As the legal historian Leonard Levy has recounted, English parliamentary enactments in the seventeenth century
permitted "[p]romiscuously broad warrants, [which] allowed officers to
search wherever they wanted and to seize whatever they wanted, with
52
few exceptions."
To prevent consolidation of the power to investigate and the power
to adjudicate, the Fourth Amendment requires that searches and
seizures be reasonable, and generally that such intrusions on privacy occur only after a demonstration of probable cause to a neutral decisionmaker. 53 The U.S. Supreme Court has never approved warrantless wiretapping, but has held that individuals have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in telephone calls. 5 4 When such an expectation exists, some
level of individualized suspicion is required for a court to authorize surveillance. Indeed, in United States v. United States District Court,5 5 the
Supreme Court rejected the government's assertion that domestic security justifies warrantless wiretapping. 56 The FISA-the result of the
democratic deliberative process that distinguishes Congressional lawmaking-provides structured means for the President to obtain the in57
formation the administration believes it needs.
The President essentially sought to perform all of the functions carefully divided among the branches by the Fourth Amendment when he
ordered the creation of the NSA's program of domestic electronic surveillance-he sought to determine the need for surveillance and the reasonableness of surveillance absent any congressional or judicial constraints.
50. The Court has recognized that, aside from the Fourth Amendment, the Constitution may be interpreted to provide various kinds of privacy protections. See e.g. Paul v.
Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976) (recognizing decisional privacy interest in "matters relating
to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and
education.").
51. Jacob W. Landynski, Search & Seizure and the Supreme Court 20 (Johns Hopkins
Press 1966).
52. Leonard W. Levy, Origins of the Bill of Rights 153 (Yale U. Press 1999).
53. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449-53 (1971).
54. See U.S. v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (The government's warrantless eavesdropping of phone calls placed in a public phone booth violated the defendant's fourth amendment rights because he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a closed phone booth).
55. U.S. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
56. Id. at 320-21.
57. See supra n. 20-26 and accompanying text.
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In other words, he sought to exercise the kind of unchecked power to
invade individual privacy once asserted by the English Crown and Parliament.5 8 The exercise of such power improperly excludes Congress and
the Courts from a process designed by the Framers to include them.
Justice Jackson was aware of the potential for abuse that resides in
casual and unexamined reliance on the war power as justification for all
manner of actions in the causes of security and defense. In his concurring opinion in Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 59 Jackson wrote:
No one will question that this power is the most dangerous one to free
government in the whole catalogue of powers. It usually is invoked in
haste and excitement when calm legislative consideration of constitutional limitation is difficult. It is executed in a time of patriotic fervor
that makes moderation unpopular. And, worst of all, it is interpreted
by the Judges under the influence of the same passions and pressures.
Always . . ., the Government urges hasty decision to forestall some
emergency or serve some purpose and pleads that paralysis will result if
its claims to power are denied or their confirmation delayed.
Particularly when the war power is invoked to do things to the liberties of people, or to their property or economy that only indirectly affect the conduct of the war and do not relate to management of60
the war
itself, the constitutional basis should be scrutinized with care.
The President's program of domestic electronic surveillance, justified as necessary intelligence gathering in the interest of national security, raises precisely the constitutional privacy concerns foreshadowed by
Justice Jackson.
B.
As well, the President's program comes dangerously close to compromising any remaining shred of individual privacy in relation to the government. The only way an individual would be certain to avoid the risk
of random government surveillance of the type possible through the NSA
program would be to eschew any of the commonly used contemporary
communication or transactional devices, such as telephones, electronic
mail, or credit cards. As Professor Laurence Tribe has noted:
58. See Landynski, supra n. 51, at 20-25. (English law gave the Crown and Parliament
broad search and seizure powers to control "seditious and nonconformist publications";
such powers were virtually limitless until efforts to control the abusive enforcement of tax
laws began to curtail this "badge of slavery" that allowed "every man's house to be entered
into and searched by persons unknown to him.").
59. Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 146-147 (1948).
60. Id. at 146-147. In his concurrence in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, Justice Kennedy emphasized that "[riespect for laws derived from the customary operation of the Executive and
Legislative Branches gives some assurance of stability in time of crisis. The Constitution is
best preserved by reliance on standards tested over time and insulated from the pressures
of the moment." 126 S.Ct. at 2799 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).
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Only the most committed-and perhaps civilly committable-hermit
can live without a telephone, without a bank account, without mail. To
say that one must take the bitter with the sweet when one licks a stamp
is to exact a high constitutional price indeed for living in contemporary
society. Under so reductive and coercive
a concept of assumed surveil61
lance, to be modern is to be exposed.
He continues, quoting Professor Yale Kamisar, as follows:
It is beginning to look as if the only way someone living in our society
can avoid "assuming the risk" that various intermediary institutions
will reveal information to the police is by engaging in drastic discipline,
62
the kind of discipline characteristic of life under totalitarian regimes.
The electronic surveillance program brings to mind descriptions of
other regimes in which privacy is an elusive luxury. Fox Butterfield, the
first Beijing Bureau Chief for the New York Times, recounted the scrutiny ordinary people experienced in the People's Republic of China in the
1980s. 63 In his book, he observed that people became "accustomed to the
constant monitoring of ...daily activity."6 4 He stated that, "the government has organized society as a security system as much as it is a social
or economic system. It is built on three overlapping and mutually reinforcing components: the danwei, or workplace, the street committee, and
the 'small group' where political study sessions are held."65 He quoted
an American resident who stated that "the Communists have created
such a thorough organization, it is like radar, it picks you up wherever
you go." 66 It is difficult, this American concluded, for foreigners to appreciate how much control this system gives the authorities over
67
Chinese.
The Chinese security organization was relentless. As Butterfield described it, workplaces keep a dossier for every employee; a person's education and work record, and any political charges made by informers in
the past were recorded, and the dossier was kept secret from the individual. 68 Butterfield reported that the Public Security Bureau maintained
61. Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1392 (2d ed., Foundation Press
1988).
62. Id. (quoting Jesse Choper, Yale Kamisar & Laurence Tribe, The Supreme Court:
Trends and Developments 143-44 (1979)).
63. Fox Butterfield, China: Alive in the Bitter Sea 322-41 (Crown Publishing Group
1982). Writing ten years after Butterfield, Ross Terrill's account of his 25 years of experience with China is largely consistent with Butterfield's description. see Ross Terrill, China
in Our Time (Simon & Schuster 1992).
64. Butterfield, supra n. 63, at 322.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 323-24; see also Terrill, supra n. 63, at 293 ("The awesome power of the state
was matched by an official ideology that reached into every corner of life.").
68. Butterfield, supra n. 63, at 323.
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agents in the post office to open and read outgoing and incoming mail. 6 9
Class monitors were stationed in universities to ensure political rectitude and discipline. 70 Street committees watched people at home. 7 1
Butterfield quoted another source as stating that the "most terrifying
power of street committee is that they can search your house whenever
they want."7 2 There was no way to be alone, as these monitors even
watched what time people go to bed, monitored domestic quarrels, and
dinner guests. 73 Radio loudspeakers were located in every home and
often there was no way to extinguish the sound. 74 According to Butterfield, the "constant exposure to public scrutiny and peer pressure makes
75
life in China like living in an army barracks."
In Butterfield's view, the Chinese combined the techniques of modern totalitarianism, the loudspeaker network, with traditional Chinese
tendency toward conformity to exercise control over society and to suppress dissent. 76 He found evidence that people lived in a state of con77
stant anxiety, fearful they would be betrayed by someone they knew.
The effects of this control system included people experiencing nervous
tension, depression, and paranoia.7 8 He quoted another Chinese friend,
69. Id. at 323-324.
70. Id. at 324.
71. Id. at 323-325.
72. Id. at 325; see also Terrill, supra n. 63, at 288 ("In Chinese society there are many
ways of being intimidated short of arrest ... ."). Terrill also relates an incident where a
student was subjected to a warrantless search on a train with a number of photographs and
journals seized from his luggage. Id. at 298-299.
73. Butterfield, supra n. 63, at 325; see also Terrill, supra n. 63, at 294 ("Authorities at
the front door of the hotel required each visitor to fill out a form about the purpose of the
visit."); Id. at 284 (describing an interaction with another friend: "'Ve can still talk,' he said
a week later, 'but only in a swimming pool.' In the water and the locker room of various
sports facilities we found an oasis of anonymity."). In another passage, Terrill describes
how a Chinese acquaintance did not want to come inside Terrill's hotel because he did not
want to answer questions of the plainclothesmen at the door. Id. at 172. One Chinese
friend described how making restaurant reservations could be used as a means of control
that could result in person being questioned at his or her job about the reason for the
meeting. Id. at 174.
74. Butterfield, supra n. 63, at 329.
75. Id. at 328.
76. Id. at 329; see also Terrill, supra n. 63, at 175 (observing that Chinese cultural
conservatism reinforced the lack of freedom under Communist rule).
77. Butterfield, supra n. 63, at 336; see also Terrill, supra n. 63, at 288 ( "A special
phone number to call in with reports of people having committed 'counterrevolutionary
acts' ran hot as many sought to save their own skins by pointing a finger at others.").
78. Butterfield, supra n. 63, at 336-341; see also Terrill, supra n. 63, at 295 ("So much
in China was illegal that if a person read the fine print of the rules-and remembered past
experience-he might hardly dare to venture outside his own door."); id. at 287 ("Leading
figures of the student movement and their advisers from university faculties, research institutes, and government organs were paralyzed by sadness and fear, in hiding, or on their
way out of the country."). Terrill observed that "the half-free and half-open condition of
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who stated that, "you can talk only by stationing a guard at your mouth.
You have to know exactly who you are talking to and the limits of what
you can say to them."7 9 Because the Public Security Ministry maintained
surmised that there was alan extensive network of informants, some
80
most no need for electronic surveillance.
While it is possible that surveillance in China may have moderated
somewhat in the last twenty or so years since Butterfield described these
techniques for monitoring and control, 8 a comparison of his description
of Chinese government surveillance with the control regime envisioned
by George Orwell in Nineteen Eighty-Four indicates that fact can be as,
or more, disturbing than fiction. In the following passage, Orwell describes the ominous streetscape and the conditions of surveillance in his
protagonist's apartment:
[Tihere seemed to be no color in anything except the posters that were
plastered everywhere. The black-mustachio'd face gazed down from
every commanding corner. There was on the house front immediately
opposite. BIG BROTHER IS WATCHING YOU, the caption said, while
the dark eyes looked deep into Winston's own....
Behind Winston's back the voice from the telescreen was still babbling
away about pig iron and the overfulfillment of the Ninth Three-Year
Plan. The telescreen received and transmitted simultaneously. Any
sound that Winston made, above the level of a very low whisper, would
be picked up by it; moreover, so long as he remained within the field of
vision which the metal plaque commanded, he could be seen as well as
heard. There was of course no way of knowing whether you were being
watched at any given moment. How often, or on what system, the
Thought Police plugged in on any individual wire was guesswork. It
was even conceivable that they watched everybody all the time. But at
any rate they could plug in your wire whenever they wanted to. You
had to live-did live, from habit that became instinct,-in the assumption that every sound you made was overheard, and except in darkness,
China had brought [an acquaintance] anguish and made him restless. Id. at 183. At another point he commented that he got the impression that one of his contacts "used the
Word 'democracy' as a synonym for 'happiness.'" Id. at 175.
79. Butterfield, supranote n. 63, at 341; see also Terrill, supra n. 63, at 284 ("Everyone
says now the smart thing is to tape your mouth. . . 'Nearly everyone felt they should 'get
into line.'").
80. Butterfield, supra n. 63, at 334.
81. The announcement by the Chinese government that it intends to restrict and penalize news media coverage of sudden events, such as natural disasters, major accidents,
public health or social safety incidents, seems to indicate that the process of change is not
linear-that change may involve as many steps backward as forward. See Joseph Kahn,
China May Fine News Media to Limit Coverage, N.Y. Times A3 (June 27, 2006) (reporting

that, in view of the wider availability of news and information through the Internet and
commercial newspapers, magazines and television stations, "Chinese authorities have also
sought fresh ways to curtail reporting on topics and events they consider harmful to social
and political stability.").

2006]

DOMESTIC ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

8
every movement scrutinized.

2

More recently, the journalist Emma Larkin traced the path Orwell
took through Burma as a member of the Imperial Police Force, and discovered that Orwell's vision of the future in Nineteen Eighty-Four presaged the methods actually employed today by Burmese Military
83
Intelligence.
The President's electronic surveillance program also recalls aspects
of the futuristic totalitarian regime, the Republic of Gilead, as envisioned
by Margaret Atwood in her dystopian novel, The Handmaid's Tale.8 4 At
one point, the narrator, Offred, recalls the take over of the government
and the public reactions to steady escalations in restrictions on freedoms,
most especially for women.8 5 Offred is a handmaid who the government
has conscripted to serve as a vessel of reproduction for a member of the
Gilead ruling elite. The following passage in particular highlights the
dangers of using the exigencies of war or attack on the nation as justification for restricting or eliminating constitutional liberties:
It was after the catastrophe, when they shot the president and machine-gunned the Congress and the army declared a state of emergency.
They blamed it on the Islamic fanatics, at the time.
Keep calm, they said on television. Everything is under control.
I was stunned. Everyone was, I know that. It was hard to believe. The
entire government gone like that. How did they get in, how did it
happen?
That was when they suspended the Constitution. They said it would be
temporary. There wasn't even any rioting in the streets. People stayed
home at night, watching television, looking for some direction. There
wasn't even an enemy you could put your finger on.

82. George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four6 -7 (The New Am. Lib. of World Literature
1961).
83. See Emma Larkin, Finding George Orwell in Burma 150-151 (Penguin Press 2005).

Early on, Larkin recounts the Burmese joke "that Orwell wrote not just one novel about the
country, but three: a trilogy comprised of Burmese Days, Animal Farm, and Nineteen

Eighty-Four." Id. at 3; see also Terrill, supra n. 63, at 293 ("Beijing was 'an Orwellian
repression in mid-June [1989 after the Tiananmen Square massacre] as silence marked the
victory of power over truth.'"). Terrill describes an analysis of the level of freedom in China
that one of his Chinese friends provided by reference to Animal Farm and Nineteen EightyFour. The friend had read Orwell's books while studying in Australia and noted that "It's
the difference between Animal Farm and 1984," he said: "1984 is about the stupidities and
deceptions of dictatorship. It's more or less admitted now that we have had these things.
But the character of the pig in Animal Farm is totally unacceptable within China. You
can't personally insult the leader!" Id. at 173.
84. Margaret Atwood, The Handmaid's Tale (Anchor Books 1998).
85. See e.g. id. at 173-180 (women were removed from their jobs, women's bank accounts were frozen, and money and other property held by women was transferred to husbands or male next of kin).
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Things continued in that state of suspended animation for weeks, although some things did happen. Newspapers were censored and some
were closed down, for security reasons they said. The roadblocks began
to appear, and Identipasses. Everyone approved of that, since it was
obvious you couldn't be too careful. They said that new elections would
be held, but that it would take some time to prepare
for them. The
86
thing to do, they said was to continue on as usual.
As a result of the suspension of individual privacy rights in the
world of Atwood's The Handmaid's Tale, a society was created in which
everyone was under constant surveillance by everyone else, including the
government, and where each person's societal role was carefully circumscribed within a limited range. Privacy, in other words, might be seen as
87
a necessary condition for freedom.
The common feature of the real-life surveillance techniques employed in China, and the fictional systems described in both Nineteen
Eighty-Four and The Handmaid's Tale, is that all three were used to
consolidate government power and insulate the government from dissent
and opposition. While justified as mechanisms for protecting public
88
safety, all were employed to secure absolute governmental power.
Public acquiescence and apathy are essential to the success of such regimes. 8 9 There is no question that the public would recognize the as86. Id. at 174; see also Terrill, supra n. 63, at 292 ("Everything is back to normal,'
purred an official spokesman, yet my acquaintances in the government did not answer
their phones, I had to pass by troops with fixed bayonets in order to keep appointments at
offices and institutes, my car was often stopped at night and searched by soldiers.").
87. See Alan F. Westin, Privacyand Freedom 24-25 (Antheneum 1967) (discussing the
importance of individual privacy to the exercise of liberty in a democratic society); cf. Terrill, supra n. 63, at 231 (quoting a journalist friend who stated that political reform was "an
absolutely essential condition for the success of economic reform" in China).
88. In Democracy in America, Alexis De Tocqueville gave the following warning:
[AIll men of centralizing genius are fond of war, which compels nations to combine
all their powers in the hands of the government. Thus, the democratic tendency
which leads men unceasingly to multiply the privileges of the state, and to circumscribe the rights of private persons, is much more rapid and constant amongst
those democratic nations which are exposed by their position to great and frequent
wars, than amongst all others.
De Tocqueville concluded by noting that, if democracies make it appear that a central government is the only power "sufficiently strong, enlightened, and secure to protect them
from anarchy," private persons will be tempted "more and more to sacrifice their rights to
their tranquility." Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in America 299 (Richard D. Heffner
ed., Mentor 1984); see also Terrill, supra n. 63, at 294 ("The classic models of a totalitarian
state trying to shore up its legitimacy were evident [in China] each day: 'enemies' were
everywhere, the government bristled with righteous indignation at them, and an appropriate 'truth' to explain the government's crusade to route them was created by the hour.").
89. See Terrill, supra n. 63, at 303 (quoting a Chinese graduate student active outside
Beijing who felt that the occupation of Tiananmen Square should have ended sooner to
avoid the final confrontation with government troops. The student believed that the citizens' movement could have built itself up and influenced events by mounting further dem-
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pects of Chinese society and the societies described in Nineteen EightFour and The Handmaid's Tale as being totalitarian and lacking in respect for civil liberties. 90 In its disregard for civil liberties, the President's program of domestic electronic surveillance, absent the
constitutional predicates that would permit the government to invade
privacy, is similarly objectionable. 9 1
III.
To be sure, the threat of terrorist attacks in the United States following September 11 should be a primary focus of this or any President's
attention. But he and his successors must attend to this vital task
within the reasonable limits established by the United States Constitution. It is said that the Constitution should not be viewed as a suicide
pact,9 2 yet that wise counsel becomes relevant only when we discover
ourselves in the midst of circumstances requiring action that the Constitution does not permit. And, as in any instance where adherence to the
rule of law is at issue, those who would claim more power than seems
obviously available should bear the burden of demonstrating that they
onstrations at intervals, noting that, "In South Korea it took twenty years of this activity to
break down authoritarianism.").
90. The converse is also true. Terrill notes that the Chinese student democracy movement in 1989 "did something to destroy the image of China as exotic, for the aspirations of
the young in Tiananmen Square were recognizable to people all over the world." See Terrill, supra n.63, at 336. He goes on to explain that 'social individualism and political pluralism will not come to China ready-made from the West . . . and in the bright light of
freedom, the Chinese will discover their solidarity with everyone else around the globe."
Id.

91. Hamdan, 126 U.S. at 2798 (plurality) ("[I1n undertaking to try Hamdan and subject him to criminal punishment, the Executive is bound to comply with the Rule of Law
that prevails in this jurisdiction."); see also id. at 2785 (plurality opinion) (describing shortcomings of charges against Hamdan as 'indicative of a broader inability on the Executive's
part here to satisfy the most basic precondition-at least in absence of specific congressional authorization-for establishment of military commissions: military necessity."). In
Hamdan, the Court noted that, "the legality of a tribunal ... cannot be established by bare
assurances that, whatever the character of the court or the procedures it follows, individual
adjudicators will act fairly." Id. at 2798.
92. See Richard A. Posner, Security Versus Civil Liberties, 288 A. Mthly. (D.C.) 46
(Dec. 2001) (referring to the terrorist attacks of September 11, and to Justice Jackson's
admonition that the Bill of Rights should not be regarded as a suicide pact). Indeed, in
ruling in Hamdan that the government's plan to try Guantanamo detainees before specially constituted military commissions was unconstitutional, the Court assumed "the
truth of the message implicit in [the charges against Hamdan], that Hamdan is a dangerous individual whose beliefs, if acted upon, would cause great harm and even death to
innocent civilians, and who would act upon those beliefs if given the opportunity."
Hamdan, 126 U.S. at 2798.
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are entitled to such power. 9 3 At this time, President Bush and representatives of his administration have not come close to satisfying this
standard.
If nothing else, we should keep some hope that the revelation of the
President's covert authorization of a domestic electronic surveillance
program will persuade Congress to involve itself in the supervision of the
President's efforts. As Professor Noah Feldman has concluded:
No court alone can do the job of protecting liberty from the exercise of
executive power. For the most important of tasks, the people's elected
representatives need to be actively involved. When we let them abdicate this role, the violations start to multiply, and we get the secret
surveillance and the classified renditions
and the unnamed torture that
94
we all recognize as un-American.
The Framers feared that the exercise of such power as the President
has asserted in this instance could be too easily turned to ill ends; they
did not trust that the better angels of our nature would serve to control
unchecked ambition-or institutional hubris. No aspect of the President's domestic electronic surveillance program, or the reported justifications for that program-much less claims that the President may
disregard direct Constitutional mandates related to the exercise of his
discretion-suggests that, more than 200 years later, we should entertain a different view.
POSTSCRIPT
At this writing, members of Congress have discussed a proposal that
would authorize the FISA court to review the President's domestic electronic surveillance program. 95 It remains unclear whether such review
would satisfy constitutional standards. 9 6 Further, in the only decision to
date on the issue, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan concluded that the President's program violates, among
97
other things, separation of powers doctrine.
93. See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 683 (6th Cir. 2002) (observing that
"[d]emocracies die behind closed doors. . .[and] Selective information is misinformation.
The Framers of the First Amendment 'did not trust any government to separate the true
from the false for us.' They protected the people against secret government." (quoting
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
94. Noah Feldman, Our PresidentialEra: Who Can Check the President?,N.Y. Times
652 (Jan. 8, 2006).
95. See Eric Lichtblau, Bush Would Let Secret Court Sift Wiretap Process, N.Y. Times
Al (July 14, 2006).
96. See Laurence Tribe, "SigningStatements"Are a Phantom Target, Boston Globe A9
(Aug. 9, 2006) (arguing FISA court review does not satisfy constitutional requirements).
97. See ACLU v. NSA, 2006 WL 2371463, *23 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 17, 2006). Other cases
are pending. See e.g., Centerfor ConstitutionalRights v. Bush, No. 1:06CV00313 (S.D.N.Y.,
filed Jan. 17, 2006) (copy on file with the authors).

